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ABSTRACT 
Information in Conflicts  
by Karl Wärneryd* 
We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common but uncertain value. We show 
that less resources are spent in equilibrium if one party is privately informed about the 
value of a prize than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. 
Furthermore, the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is 
the informed agent. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Information in Konflikten 
 
Der Autor untersucht einen Wettbewerb mit zwei Spielern um einen Gewinn von 
allgemeinem, jedoch unbekanntem Wert. Er zeigt, daß im Vergleich zu einer Situation 
in der beide oder keiner von beiden Akteuren die Höhe des Gewinns kennen, weniger 
Ressourcen im Gleichgewicht verwendet werden, als in dem Fall in dem einer der 
beiden Spieler über die Höhe des Gewinns informiert ist. Des weiteren ist es ex ante 
streng genommen wahrscheinlicher, daß der uninformierte Spieler den Gewinn erhält 
und nicht der informierte. 
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1 Introduction
Most of economic theory focuses on the analysis of voluntary market transac-
tions, with well-deÞned property rights and costlessly enforceable contracts
implicitly in the background. Many real-world transactions, in contrast, in-
volve outright conßict. Such conßict takes many forms; theft, armed warfare,
lobbying, and litigation are just a few examples. All have in common that
they involve resources that could have been used productively being invested
in eﬀecting transfers of wealth. In this paper, we investigate the eﬀects of
asymmetric information in such conßicts.
SpeciÞcally, we model conßict as a contest. In a contest, the participants
make eﬀorts or expenditures in order to increase their probability of winning
a prize or object. We consider the case of two agents competing for a prize
that would be of the same value to both if both knew the value with certainty,
but we assume this value is uncertain. This assumption of ex post common
valuation seems natural in a number of potential applications, of which the
following are just a few examples.
 Firms lobbying for monopoly privileges in a market, where one Þrm is
the incumbent in the market.
 An investor trying to recover (e g, through the courts) funds from an
entrepreneur.
 Two parties contesting each others claim to a piece of property, where
one party is the possessor of the property.
In all of these cases, one party has superior information about the ex post
common value of the prize being contested.
In this paper, we exhibit a model in which this type of asymmetric infor-
mation leads risk neutral agents to spend less in equilibrium than under sym-
metric information. This suggests, among other things, an explanation for
the results of empirical studies on rent seeking (e g, Katz and Rosenberg [10]
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and Laband and Sophocleus [12]), which seem to indicate that expenditure
on such activities is typically much lower than the expected value of the
prize. While it is well known that, in a complete information setting, asym-
metry of valuations tends to lower equilibrium aggregate expenditure (see, e
g, Hillman and Riley [7]), in many cases asymmetric information seems the
most natural source of such divergences in valuation.
Other contributions to the theory of informational asymmetry in contests
include Harstad [6], who studies imperfectly, but symmetrically, privately in-
formed agents in a contest where the highest bidder wins with certainty.
Linster [13] and Hurley and Shogren [9] study models with independent val-
uations. The setup in the present paper is not a special case of either of
these approaches. The model closest in spirit to the present one that we are
aware of is found in Bernardo, Talley, and Welch [1], who study a variant of
the two-type case in the larger context of a contracting problem with a court
battle as the outside option, but focus on diﬀerent issues and do not draw
any general conclusions.
The contests studied in this paper are also special cases of imperfectly
discriminatory all-pay auctions, i e, auctions where all participants pay their
bids. (See, e g, Krishna and Morgan [11].) From the point of view of auc-
tion theory, perhaps the most interesting result in the present paper is the
mildly paradoxical observation that the uninformed player in an asymmetric
information contest wins the object with strictly higher probability than the
informed player, something that cannot happen in a Þrst-price auction.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the class of con-
tests under study, and solves for equilibrium under the two possible sym-
metric information scenarios. This provides a benchmark for the analysis of
asymmetric information in Section 3, where we prove, among other things,
that aggregate expenditure in equilibrium is strictly less under asymmetric
information, and that the uninformed player is more likely to win. Section 4
discusses some example distributions for the value of the prize. Section 5
suggests some extensions and concludes.
3
2 Symmetric Information
Two risk neutral agents, 1 and 2, compete for a prize of value y, where y
is distributed according to the continuous cumulative distribution F , the
support of which is contained in [y,∞), where y > 0. Let y be the expected
value of the prize. The agents make expenditures in order to increase their
probability of winning. SpeciÞcally, if agent 1 expends x1 and agent 2 expends
x2, we assume the probability of agent i winning the prize is
1
pi(x1, x2) :=
(
xi/(x1 + x2) if x1 + x2 > 0
1/2 otherwise.
This particular type of contest is sometimes referred to as a lottery contest,
since it is equivalent to buying tickets at unit cost in a lottery where the
winner is drawn from the set of tickets sold. We note, for future reference,
that as long as we have x1+x2 > 0, pi is convex in the opponents expenditure.
The expected utility of agent i if neither agent is informed of the value y
when making his expenditure decision is then
uUi (x1, x2) :=
Z ∞
y
pi(x1, x2)ydF (y)− xi.
It is easily veriÞed that this objective function is strictly concave in own ex-
penditure given the expenditure of the other party. Furthermore, it cannot
be the case that nobody expends anything in equilibrium, since in case one
agents expenditure is zero the other can appropriate the prize with proba-
bility one for an arbitrarily small expenditure.
1This particular contest success function was introduced by Tullock [18, 19]. For further
discussion, see, e g, Hirshleifer [8]. For an axiomatization, see Skaperdas [16]. Fullerton
and McAfee [5], Esteban and Ray [4], and Nitzan [15] is a small sample of the large body
of literature on applications of this class of contests. Results for more general success
functions are hard to come by. By allowing for general distributions, however, we attain
the same level of generality as auction theory in general.
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Hence the best reply of agent i given the expenditure of the other agent
is given by the Þrst-order condition
∂uUi (x1, x2)
∂xi
=
xj
(x1 + x2)2
y − 1 = 0 for j 6= i.
Solving the resultant set of simultaneous equations, we Þnd that each agent
expends xS := y/4 in equilibrium.
Similarly, it is easily seen that if both agents are informed about y when
making their expenditures, then for any y they will each expend xi := y/4.
Hence ex ante expected individual expenditure in this case isZ ∞
y
y
4
dF (y) =
y
4
= xS.
We summarize these results as follows.
Proposition 1 Under either symmetric information scenario, each player
expends xS = y/4 in expectation.
That the two symmetric information scenarios are equivalent from an
ex ante point of view is, of course, an artifact of risk neutrality.2 But this
setting makes the eﬀect of informational asymmetry, which we study next,
more interesting.
3 Asymmetric Information
Consider next what happens if one agent is informed of y but the other
agent is uninformed. The uninformed agent is now potentially subject to
an analogue of the winners curse, and hence cannot rationally estimate the
value of the prize at its expectation. We say an analogue of the winners
curse because the latter is the phenomenon where in a Þrst-price auction
2For a discussion of the role of risk aversion in contests generally, see Skaperdas and
Gan [17].
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the uninformed agent only wins if he has overbid. In a lottery contest, an
arbitrarily small expenditure always yields a positive probability of winning.
Hence it may turn out ex post that the object has in fact been obtained
rather inexpensively.
The informed agents objective function, given the realization y, is now
uI(y) :=
xI(y)
xU + xI(y)
y − xI(y),
where xU is the expenditure of the uninformed agent and xI(y) is the expen-
diture of the informed agent as a function of the value y. We shall sometimes
refer to y as the type of the informed player. The Þrst partial derivative of
this objective function with respect to xI(y) is
∂uI(y)
∂xI(y)
=
xU
(xU + xI(y))2
y − 1,
which is negative for all xI(y) ≥ 0 if we have xU > y. The informed agents
best reply function, given y, is therefore
xI(y) =
½√
xUy − xU if xU ≤ y
0 otherwise.
Consider next the uninformed agent, whose objective function is now
uU :=
Z ∞
y
xU
xU + xI(y)
ydF (y)− xU .
It cannot be the case in equilibrium that xI(y) = 0 for all y. This would
imply xU ≥ y¯. But given that no type of the informed player expends a
positive amount, this cannot be a best reply on the part of the uninformed
player, since he could lower his expenditure and still win with probability
one in all states. (Of course, in the model as speciÞed, the uninformed player
does not even have a best reply when all types of the opponent expend zero.)
The relevant condition for an optimal expenditure level on the part of the
uninformed agent, given xI(y), is therefore
∂uU
∂xU
=
Z ∞
y
xI(y)
(xU + xI(y))2
ydF (y)− 1 = 0.
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Note that the informed agents Þrst order condition for a positive expenditure
may be written
(xU + xI(y))
2 = xUy.
Substituting into the uninformed agents Þrst order condition, this implies
that we have that
xU =
Z ∞
y
xI(y)dF (y)
in equilibrium.3 That is, we have proved the following.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, the uninformed and informed player expend the
same amount in expectation.
Expanding the uninformed players Þrst order condition further, using
the informed agents best reply function, we get the condition
1√
xU
Z ∞
xU
√
ydF (y)− (1− F (xU))− 1 = 0. (1)
We shall also utilitize that (1) may be rearranged to yield
xU =
1
(2− F (xU))2
µZ ∞
xU
√
ydF (y)
¶2
. (2)
DeÞne z :=
R∞
y
√
ydF (y). Suppose we have z2/4 ≤ y. Then setting xU =
z2/4 implies
R∞
xU
√
ydF (y) = z, and hence fulÞlls (1). We shall call such an
equilibrium, in which every type of the informed player expends a positive
amount, an interior equilibrium.
More generally, we have the following, which is proved in the Appendix.
3Consider also the more general class of contest success functions axiomatized by
Skaperdas [16], where we have pi(x1, x2) = f(xi)/(f(x1) + f(x2)), with f an increasing
function. Assuming f(0) = 0, the corresponding equilibrium property is f(xU)/f
0(xU) =R
(f(xI(y)/f 0(xI(y)))dF (y). One class of success functions for which equilibrium equality
of expected expenditure can then immediately be seen to hold is the one where f(x) = xr
for some positive constant r.
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Proposition 2 The asymmetric information contest has a unique equilib-
rium.
We next consider aggregate expenditure in equilibrium. Recall that both
parties expend the same amount in expectation. It is therefore suﬃcient to
consider the amount xU expended in equilibrium by the uninformed player.
Although it holds generally that expenditure is strictly lower under asym-
metric information than in either of the symmetric information scenarios,
it is perhaps easiest to illustrate by considering the case when there is an
interior equilibrium. In this case, we have xU = z
2/4. Since y → √y is a
strictly concave function, by Jensens inequality we have z <
√
y, and there-
fore z2 < y. Hence we must have xU < y/4. Intuitively, in order to escape
the winners curse, the uninformed player behaves as if the prize was worth
z2 rather than y in expectation. We prove the following more general result
in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 Aggregate expenditure is strictly lower under asymmetric in-
formation than under symmetric information.
This result seems related to the observation (made by, e g, Hillman and
Riley [7] and Che and Gale [2]) that, in a complete information environment,
asymmetry of valuations tends to lower equilibrium expenditure.
Interior equilibria are of some special interest. We know from Proposi-
tion 3 that in any equilibrium, we have that
xU <
y
4
.
A suﬃcient condition for the existence of a unique equilibrium with xU =
z2/4 is therefore that we have y/4 ≤ y, i e, that y ≤ 4y. Hence we have the
following.
Corollary 1 Suppose we have y ≤ 4y. Then each type of the informed player
expends a positive amount in equilibrium.
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A natural comparative statics experiment is to consider an increase in F
in the sense of Þrst order stochastic dominance. Unfortunately, this concept
does not have much cutting power in the present model. To see why, let G
strictly dominate F in the sense of Þrst order stochastic dominance. Now
consider the left-hand side of the equilibrium condition (1), and Þx xU . If
F is replaced by G, we have (1/
√
xU)
R∞
xU
√
ydG(y) > (1/
√
xU)
R∞
xU
√
ydF (y),
but −(1−G(xU)) < −(1−F (xU)). Hence the net eﬀect could go either way.
It is therefore in principle possible to construct examples where Þrst order
stochastic dominance implies a lowering of equilibrium expenditure.
Let xFU and x
G
U be the respective equilibrium expenditures of the unin-
formed player associated with the two distributions. For the special case
where equilibrium under both distributions is interior, we have that
xFU =
1
4
Z ∞
xF
U
√
ydF (y) <
1
4
Z ∞
xG
U
√
ydG(y) = xGU .
Similarly, we may consider the eﬀects of an increase in riskiness, or second
order stochastic dominance, under the same assumptions. Let G be a mean-
preserving spread of F . It is then straightforward that xGU < x
F
U .
A suﬃcient condition for it to be the case that equilibrium under two dif-
ferent distributions involves positive expenditure by all types of the informed
player in both cases is that the support of both distributions is small enough
in a speciÞc sense. Suppose both F and G are supported on [y, y], and that
we have y < 4y. Then the condition of Corollary 1 is satisÞed. We have thus
proved the following limited comparative statics result.
Proposition 4 Suppose F and G are two distributions supported on [y, y],
where y < 4y. Then
1. if G strictly Þrst order stochastically dominates F , we have xFU < x
G
U ,
and
2. if G is a mean-preserving spread of F , we have xGU < x
F
U .
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In equilibrium, the expected utilities of the respective players may be
written as
EuU =
Z xU
y
ydF (y) + xU(1− F (xU))
and
EuI =
Z ∞
xU
ydF (y)− xU(3− F (xU)).
Consider now a comparison with the scenario in which neither player knows y.
In the special case of an interior equilibrium it is easily seen that the informed
player is better oﬀ in expectation in the asymmetric information scenario,
and the uninformed player worse oﬀ. In this case, we have EuU = xU = z
2/4
and EuI = y − 3xU = y − 3z2/4. Since, again, y → √y is strictly concave,
we have z2 < y, and therefore EuU < y/4 and EuI > y/4. More generally,
we have the following, which is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 5 In equilibrium of the asymmetric information contest, we
have EuU < y/4 (the uninformed player is strictly worse oﬀ in expectation
than if both were uninformed) and EuI > y/4 (the informed player is strictly
better oﬀ in expectation than if both were uninformed).
Since we have EuU+EuI = y−2xU > y/2, there is an eﬃciency gain from
asymmetric information relative to the two symmetric information scenarios.
The above result also tells us that this gain in its entirety accrues to the
informed player.
This also allows us to say something about the incentives to acquire infor-
mation. Suppose both players are initially uninformed, but before entering
the contest have the option of independently becoming informed at a cost of
c > 0. From an ex ante perspective, taking into account later equilibrium
play of the contest, the information acquisition problem then looks like the
game of Figure 1. By studying the equilibria of this game, we can Þnd the
subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the extensive form game as a whole.
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Player 2
Stay uninformed Get informed
Player 1 Stay uninformed y/4, y/4 EuU < y/4,EuI − c
Get informed EuI − c,EuU < y/4 (y/4)− c, (y/4)− c
Figure 1: The information acquisition game.
For suﬃciently small c, i e, c < min{EuI − (y/4), (y/4) − EuU}, getting
informed will clearly be a dominant strategy for each player. Since the ex-
pected outcome of a contest where both parties are informed is the same as if
neither was informed, under these circumstances the unique subgame perfect
outcome of the game is ineﬃcient. The game eﬀectively has the structure of
a Prisoners Dilemma in which the contestants are led to ineﬃciently acquire
information.
Finally, we consider each contestants probability of winning the prize
from an ex ante perspective. DeÞne xI :=
R∞
y xI(y)dF (y), the expected
equilibrium expenditure of the informed player. Now note that for any con-
test success function p that is strictly convex in the opponents expenditure,
as the one under consideration here is easily veriÞed to be, by Jensens in-
equality we have thatZ ∞
y
p(xU , xI(y))dF (y) > p(xU , xI).
In the present context, from Lemma 1 we have p(xU , xI) = 1/2. Hence we
have proved the following somewhat surprising result.
Proposition 6 In equilibrium, the uninformed agents ex ante probability of
winning is strictly greater than that of the informed agent.
It is worthwhile to contrast this with equilibrium in a standard Þrst-price
auction under the same information assumptions. In the two-player case,
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it can be shown that there is a unique equilibrium where the uninformed
player uses a mixed strategy, and the equilibrium distributions of bids are
identical for the informed and uninformed player. Hence each player wins
with probability one half. (See, e g, Milgrom and Weber [14].) But the two-
player setting is a special case in the Þrst-price framework. In case there are
at least two informed players, the uninformed agent can only win when he has
overbid. Hence for any positive bid, the expectation of the uninformed agent
is negative. It follows that in equilibrium, uninformed players must bid zero
and consequently have a zero probability of winning. The crucial diﬀerence
between our contest and a Þrst-price auction is that a player always has a
positive probability of winning if he has expended a positive amount. That
is, even very low bids leave a positive probability of winning a potentially
valuable object.
Dixit [3], in a discussion of Þrst-mover advantage in complete information
contests, calls the player most likely to win in equilibrium the favorite. In the
present incomplete information context, the ex ante favorite is thus somewhat
paradoxically the uninformed player.
4 Examples
The Pareto Distribution
Suppose the value y is distributed on [1,∞) according to
F (y) = 1− y1−α,
where α > 2. The density function associated with F is then
f(y) = (α− 1)y−α
and the expected value of the prize is
y =
Z ∞
1
(α− 1)y1−αdy = α− 1
α− 2 .
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We have that
z =
Z ∞
1
√
ydF (y) =
2α− 2
2α− 3 .
Since we have α > 2, we have z < 2. Hence we have z2/4 < 1 = y, so
equilibrium is always interior.
The equilibrium expenditure of the uninformed player is therefore
xU =
z2
4
=
1
4
µ
2α− 2
2α− 3
¶2
.
Since we have that Z ∞
1
1√
y
dF (y) =
2α− 2
2α− 1 ,
the expected win probability of the uninformed player isZ ∞
1
xU
xU + xI(y)
dF (y) =
Z ∞
1
xU√
xUy
dF (y) =
√
xU
Z ∞
1
1√
y
dF (y) =
2(α− 1)2
3− 8α+ 4α2 .
Since this quantity is strictly decreasing in α and approaches 1/2 as α ap-
proaches inÞnity, it is always strictly greater than 1/2, as expected. For
example, if we have α = 3 the uninformed player wins with an ex ante prob-
ability of 8/15.
The Two-Type Case
Suppose there are just two possible values of the prize, yH and yL, where
we have 0 < yL < yH . Let the probability of yH be q. Although this
discrete distribution does not strictly fall into the class considered previously,
it usefully illustrates some central ideas. Since we can characterize this case
completely, it is also of some independent interest.
We Þrst note that there can be no equilibrium such that xI(yH) =
xI(yL) = 0. As before, the informed agents best reply expenditure will
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be positive if and only if we have xU < y. Hence in the proposed equilib-
rium, we must have xU ≥ yH . But this cannot be a best reply on the part of
the uninformed agent, since he could lower his expenditure and still win with
probability one in both states of the world. Therefore there is no equilibrium
where the informed agent never expends a positive amount.
Two possibilities remain.
Case 1: Both informed types are active. Suppose we have xI(yL) >
0 and xI(yH) > 0. The uninformed agents Þrst order condition for a best
reply expenditure is then
(1− q) xI(yL)
(xU + xI(yL))2
yL + q
xI(yH)
(xU + xI(yH))2
yH − 1 =
(1− q) 1√
xU
√
yL + q
1√
xU
√
yH − 2 = 0,
so equilibrium expenditure is
xU =
(q
√
yH + (1− q)√yL)2
4
.
We must have xU < yL for this to be an equilibrium, i e, that
q <
q
yL/yH
1−
q
yL/yH
=: q.
Case 2: Only the highest informed type is active. Suppose we
have xI(yL) = 0. The uninformed agents Þrst-order condition then reduces
to
q
xI(yH)
(xU + xI(yH))2
yH − 1 = q 1√
xU
√
yH − 1− q = 0,
so we have that
xU =
Ã
q
1 + q
!2
yH .
In order for this to be consistent with the lowest type expending nothing, we
must have xU ≥ yL, i e, that
q ≥ q.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium regions for the two-type case.
Figure 2 illustrates both types of equilibrium.
Note that in the Case 2 equilibrium, the uninformed players probability
of winning the object is
1− q + q xU
xU + xI(yH)
= 1− q + q
2
1 + q
> 1/2.
Let q → 0 and yL/yH → 0, so that the condition for the existence of equi-
librium is satisÞed. Then the probability of the uninformed player winning
approaches 1. That is, if the high value is much greater than the low value,
and correspondingly unlikely to obtain, then the uninformed player is almost
certain to win in equilibrium.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have studied a model of a common value contest under diﬀerent as-
sumptions about the information held by the players. We showed that when
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one player knows the value with certainty and the other player only knows
its prior distribution, aggregate equilibrium expenditure is strictly less than
in either the scenario where both players know the value with certainty or
the scenario where neither player knows the value. In the terminology of
rent-seeking theory, asymmetric information leads to less dissipation of the
contested value.
This result opens the question of whether in a setting with more than
two players there is some nontrivial allocation of information that minimizes
aggregate expenditure. We suggest such multiplayer models as an interesting
topic for further study.
We also found that in equilibrium under asymmetric information, the un-
informed player wins with a strictly higher probability than does the informed
player, in contrast with what would be the case in a Þrst-price auction. It
is clear that this result must also carry over to a larger class of models. It
also has interesting implications for applications of the model. For instance,
it suggests that, in the absence of any legal presumptions in favor of the
possessor, in a legal battle over property rights in some object we would be
most likely to see the object change hands.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. We Þrst prove existence. DeÞne the function
g(x) :=
1√
x
Z ∞
x
√
ydF (y)− (1− F (x))− 1.
A zero of g fulÞlls the Þrst-order condition (1). We have that
g(y) =
z√
y
− 2.
Suppose we have g(y) ≤ 0. This implies z2/4 ≤ y. Then setting xU = z2/4
is an equilibrium. Suppose instead we have g(y) > 0. We also have that
lim
x→∞ g(x) = −1 < 0.
16
Hence if xU = z
2/4 is not an equilibrium, then, since g is continuous, by the
intermediate value theorem there is some Þnite x > y such that g(x) = 0.
We next prove uniqueness. We have that
∂g(x)
∂x
= −
R∞
x
√
ydF (y)
2 (
√
x)
3 < 0,
i e, g is strictly decreasing in x. Hence an x satisfying (1) must be unique.
2
Proof of Proposition 3. We know from Lemma 1 that both parties expend
the same amount in expectation. Hence we need only consider xU . Since the
function y →√y is strictly concave, by Jensens inequality we have that
1
1− F (xU)
Z ∞
xU
√
ydF (y) <
Ã
1
1− F (xU)
Z ∞
xU
ydF (y)
!1/2
.
Squaring both sides and multiplying by (1− F (xU))/4, we get
1
4(1− F (xU))
µZ ∞
xU
√
ydF (y)
¶2
<
1
4
Z ∞
xU
ydF (y).
Since we have 1/(2− F (xU))2 ≤ 1/(4(1 − F (xU))) for all xU < ∞, we have
that
xU =
1
(2− F (xU))2
µZ ∞
xU
√
ydF (y)
¶2
<
1
4
Z ∞
xU
ydF (y) <
1
4
Z xU
y
ydF (y) +
1
4
Z ∞
xU
ydF (y) =
y
4
= xS.
2
Proof of Proposition 5. DeÞne the function
hU(x) :=
Z x
y
ydF (y) + x(1− F (x)).
We have that
∂hU(x)
∂x
= 1− F (x) > 0.
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Since from Proposition 3 we know that xU < y/4, we then have that
EuU = hU(xU) < hU(y/4) =
Z y˜/4
y
ydF (y) +
y
4
− y
4
F (y/4) ≤
y
4
F (y/4) +
y
4
− y
4
F (y/4) =
y
4
.
Next deÞne the function
hI(x) =
Z ∞
x
ydF (y)− x(3− F (x)).
We have that
∂hI(x)
∂x
= F (x)− 3 < 0.
Hence we have that
EuI = hI(xU) > hI(y/4) =
Z ∞
y˜/4
ydF (y)− 3 y
4
+
y
4
F (y/4) ≥Z ∞
y˜/4
ydF (y)− 3 y
4
+
Z y˜/4
y
ydF (y) = y − 3
4
y =
y
4
.
2
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